broader effort to eliminate world hunger, or will an enduring commitment to national independence guide its approach?
Critically, ongoing crises in international food markets are occurring at a time when China's continuing capacity to feed its growing population is under question. Despite abundant grain reserves, an estimated 10 per cent of the Chinese population is still undernourished, the rural labor force is declining, and agricultural productivity is increasingly vulnerable to climate change, natural disasters, and water shortages. No longer a traditional agrarian society, China has reached a critical juncture in its modernization drive, leading some analysts to predict that the centuries old norm of maintaining self-sufficiency in basic foods cannot prevail.
In recent years, Beijing has pursued a dual strategy of outsourcing agricultural production overseas while expanding agricultural assistance and emergency relief. For a brief period in 2005, China became the world's third largest food donor, and later pledged US$70 million in grain aid to the drought stricken countries in the Horn of Africa, promoted in the official media as the largest contribution in the history of the People's Republic. 4 China's new found status as a food donor coupled with its agricultural activities overseas raises an important question about its role in the global governance of food security.
To date, studies on China's engagement in collective efforts to ensure a reliable supply and fair distribution of food across the globe have been largely one-dimensional.
Scholars and policy analysts alike have tended to focus upon the way in which food security concerns at the domestic level are likely to affect world food markets. The broader question of how China is contributing to the global effort to combat world hunger has been largely overlooked. Our understanding of Chinese participation in the international food regime is partial at best. While an emerging literature exists on Chinese aid, especially in relation to investments and aid projects in Africa, few studies have investigated China's contribution to international food aid. Chinese involvement is more visible, and arguably more likely to make a significant impact.
At a time of growing anxiety over China's rising power and influence in the world, geopolitical factors are dominating debates over its role in global governance. Concerns are rising in Europe, the United States, and Australia that China may be seeking to undermine the current Western dominated international order by pursuing its own agenda that is counter to pre-existing liberal norms and practices. 6 From a power-centric perspective, growing competition over food is just one more example of the struggle for supremacy in a world of scarcity. References to "food wars" and "food superpowers" have proliferated in both the Western and Chinese literature on global food security. 7 The perennial question of whether 5 China can feed itself now coalesces with more recent concerns over "land grabbing" in Africa. Chinese scholars are more inclined to worry about the possible threat from toxic laden food imports, or the potential for grain wars with the United States. 8 A major limitation with the realist worldview is that a monocausal explanation is inadequate for the purpose of assessing the complex motivations behind Chinese international behavior; it fails to engage with economic incentives, and ignores the potential for national and global interests to converge.
Alternative approaches that focus on international responsibility as the sine qua non of a rising power offer a more useful lens by highlighting both the cooperative and competitive elements of China's emerging influence within the international system.
International responsibility generally refers to enhanced participation in addressing global concerns-stakeholder participation and burden sharing in the delivery of global public goods. This, in turn, entails greater involvement in the negotiation of international norms, both in relation to traditional norms vis-à-vis the right to autonomous political status and evolving new norms such as the responsibility to protect, the non-use of military force to maintain border stability, and adherence to multilateral trade dispute mechanisms. While existing accounts of China's international responsibility reveal complex patterns of engagement that vary across issue areas, a consensus appears to be emerging that China is an important, albeit reluctant, stakeholder in global governance, intent on biding its time for the Earthscan, 2004 In the following sections of this paper, I first address the current global food crisis followed by a discussion of the international food regime. Attention then turns to China and the complex question of whether it can feed its own population while simultaneously contributing to feeding the world. In the final section of the paper I examine China's recent transition from food recipient to food donor considering both its emergency relief activities and agricultural development assistance, especially in Africa. The paper concludes with a discussion of China's role in changing the rules and norms of international conduct.
From stability to crisis: Food as a source of insecurity in the twenty-first century
The global food crisis in 2007-08 marked a watershed in the history of the world food system. Following three decades of relatively cheap food and reliance upon imports as a guarantee of national security, high and volatile food prices, combined with tight supplies, triggered major shortfalls leading to a crisis in world food markets. 
Redesigning food security governance
Historically, the international food regime has its origins in the aftermath of the First World
War when the United States initiated major food operations for the purpose of encouraging political stability. President Herbert Hoover played a major role in coordinating efforts across private and publicly funded agencies to ensure the disbursement of surplus cheap food to those most in need. Desperate food shortages in Europe after the Second World War meant that at least 25 percent of the total aid package of US$13.5 billion under the Marshall Plan was committed "to food, feed, and fertilizer." While the importance of access, monitoring, and transparency are now widely recognized as core imperatives promoting the effective delivery of emergency food aid, new donors such as China, Russia, and India have yet to be socialized into evolving international 30 The Food for Peace Act stipulates that "it is the policy of the United States to use its abundant agricultural productivity to promote the foreign policy of the United States by enhancing the food security of the developing world through the use of agricultural commodities and local currencies accruing under this act to (1) combat world hunger and malnutrition and their causes; (2) promote broad-based, equitable, and sustainable development, including agricultural development; (3) expand international trade; (4) foster and encourage the development of private enterprise and democratic participation in developing countries; and (5) prevent conflicts." www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/foodaid/pl480/Food_for_Peace_Act.pdf. 31 World Food Programme, "Korea, Democratic Reople's Republic (DPRK)," www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk.
practice. The Chinese "no strings" attached approach is clearly at variance with the United Nations "no access, no food" principle intended to enforce stricter government compliance over reaching those most in need. A lack of agreement over how food should be distributed is also acting as a constraint on aid delivery. Under current US international food aid regulations, food must be shipped from the host country rather than sourced nearer the recipient state. The problems associated with this approach such as the high degree of waste, long lead times in deliveries, and possible distorting effects upon local markets are wellknown. A new Senate proposal to create a permanent authority to supervise local procurement is a positive step in the direction of greater flexibility that, in turn, is likely to enhance aid effectiveness. Reforms are also underway to improve United Nations (UN) systemwide coherence on food security. As set out in the UN Secretary General's Zero Hunger Campaign launched at Rio+20, the five objectives of a coherent UN systemwide approach towards food and nutrition security include: (1) achieving 100 percent access to adequate food all year around, (2) ending malnutrition in pregnancy and early childhood, (3) making all food systems sustainable, (4) increasing growth in productivity and incomes of smallholders, especially women, and (5) achieving a zero rate of food waste.
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There is still a need to tackle major problems relating to international trade such as reducing competition between food and fuel, promoting open agricultural trade, and strengthening the regulation of food reserves in order to respond to emergencies. In these key areas, the Group of Twenty (G20) has taken a leading role. Under the auspices of this informal grouping of finance ministers and Central Bank governors, concrete initiatives are underway to reinforce transparency in agricultural markets though the establishment of an agricultural market information system; to promote the exemption of export restrictions on emergency aid; and to create a regional pilot programme for low-income and food deficit countries in West Africa in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African
States.
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Given the disagreement amongst member countries over the possible distorting effects of large-scale buffer stocks on offsetting price movements, the regional reserve is 33 United Nations, Global Food Security, 2011, www.un-foodsecurity.org/. 34 Food Security Portal, G20, www.foodsecurityportal.org/category/category/g20.
intended for emergency response purposes only, based upon market principles. 35 While the operational arrangements have yet to be confirmed, a recent feasibility study proposed that the system should operate on a cost recovery basis with food procured from local and regional markets and distributed via national safety nets. 36 Local food preferences, the market accessibility of food stocks, and a needs-based assessment linked to an early warning system are all factors now under consideration. of their capacity to ensure sufficient food for a growing population. 40 In the words of the well-known military strategist, Cao Cao, in the era of the Three Kingdoms (220-280), "the sufficiency of food is the basis of state power." 41 Above all, as a predominantly agrarian society, "the fear of a land in perpetual hunger" is deeply ingrained in the cultural mindset.
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In the contemporary era, concerns over the risk that food will be used as a foreign policy tool to undermine China's modernization drive continue to influence how food security is both understood and acted upon. The experience of economic sanctions during the Cold War lives on in the memory of policymakers in Beijing, despite the fact that they allegedly had a minimal impact. 43 In contrast to the Soviet Union, China was not the target of an explicit food embargo. 44 More recently, as a reminder of the way in which geopolitical concerns are deeply enmeshed in the struggle to address world hunger, the debate over possible "grain wars" with the United States has led many Chinese commentators to argue that self-sufficiency should never be abandoned, and that "winning the food war, is more important than winning the oil war." In part, growing anxiety over food security has been stimulated by the international discourse on the threat emanating from China's soaring demand for food triggering huge rises in world food prices. Although Lester Brown's provocative 1995 report Who Will Feed China? Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet has been criticized on grounds of the validity of the data, at the time it struck a raw nerve amongst leaders in Beijing. 46 The seductiveness of his thesis lives on today in the popular media with recent alarmist predictions that the United
States as "the world's breadbasket for more than half a century … will probably have to share
[its] harvest with the Chinese, no matter how much that raises our prices."
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The Chinese interpretation of food security is also influenced by concerns over food safety. The melamine scandal of 2009, when it was discovered that a plastic, melamine, had been added to milk to increase its protein content causing six babies to die and over 300,000
people to become sick, has heightened public awareness over food contamination. 48 Released in the aftermath of the scandal, the Chinese government's "Food Safety Law" outlines a number of regulations, punishments, and procedures for dealing with food that has been tainted with heavy metals and other forms of environmental pollution. 49 In some cases, agricultural produce grown in polluted water and soil has led to the rise of "cancer in recent years has further strengthened the government's resolve to support domestic production and maintain near self-sufficiency in basic foods-rice, wheat, and corn.
Currently, China imports roughly 1 percent of its total grain demand, which amounts to 2 percent of global grain production. At the height of the food crisis in 2008, low levels of import-dependence meant that China was essentially shielded from the destablizing effects of market fluctuations. In the words of the National Development and Reform Commission report on enhancing food security, "the world food market caught a cold, but China did not even sneeze." 53 A domestically driven agenda is also motivated by concerns that exposure to price volatility in international markets could lead to social unrest and political instability.
Moreover, policymakers are sensitive to accusations that the Chinese food crisis poses a threat to global food security.
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To meet the target of 95 percent self-sufficiency in grain consumption, China has the world's largest grain reserves (70 percent composed of wheat or rice) located at the central, 51 58 Interview, Vice-Governor of Guangxi, Nanning, 6 June 2012. capita grain supply increased by 409 kg of grain per capita per annum. 59 The highest per capita production growth rates were in protein and fat-rich food groups, such as meat, dairy, oil, and fish (see Figure 1 ). For the past decade, grain imports have been kept at around 5 percent of total grain supply. 60 Taking a longer-term perspective, China is increasingly food insecure. National indicators that measure the key sources of agricultural production-land, water, and laborsuggest that the task of sustaining self-sufficiency in the future faces enormous challenges.
For planning purposes, 1.8 million mu (120 million hectares) of arable land represents the critical "red line" below which producing enough food to meet the demands of a rising population will not be possible. China, where up to 43 percent of total grain is produced, rainfall has steadily declined and groundwater levels have fallen by between two and five meters over the past decade. The
Chinese government predicts that water scarcity in the north will worsen in the future as the effects of climate change become more pronounced. According to the Ministry of Water
Resources, in 2010, drought led to grain losses of around 16.8 billion kgs (equivalent to 3 percent of total annual grain output).
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The so-called hollowing-out of the rural labor force is a third major concern in ensuring long-term food availability. Since "reform and opening," over half of China's rural labor force has migrated to urban areas in search of better employment. The rural labor force has aged more rapidly over time because the majority of migrant workers are young. 
Outsourcing the farm
In response to the multiple challenges of declining arable land, ecological degradation, climate change, and demographic and social changes in rural China, the government is investment: Brazil has introduced new rules prohibiting foreign companies from owning more than 5,000 hectares of farmland, and both New Zealand and Australia are currently reviewing their procedures for approving land sales. 73 In the case of Africa, the new strategy of outsourcing the farm 74 has reignited debates over China's perceived neo-colonial ambition with many critics suggesting that it is now "grabbing land" to produce food to ship home; an accusation that is refuted by the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing on the grounds that such a scheme would be "ridiculously expensive" to implement. Indeed, evidence, as yet, does not suggest that this is actually happening in practice. While Chinese corporations are producing food in neighboring countries for the domestic market, one example being the 400,000 hectare farm on the China-Russia border jointly owned by China's Huaxin Group and Russia's Armada software company, the situation is different on the African continent where commercial activities are aimed at producing food to meet local needs, or to sell on the international market. 75 From a food security perspective, the logic underpinning the new strategy is more strategic. As one official from the Ministry of Agriculture aptly remarked: "if African states can grow more food themselves, they will be less reliant upon the international market, creating more space for China to import food."
From recipient to stakeholder in global food aid
The shift towards agricultural production overseas is taking place at the same time as a renewed effort to promote agricultural assistance in developing countries. Commercially driven in part, Chinese agricultural assistance is also a reflection of a genuine commitment to correct the mistakes of the past and ensure that developing countries benefit from the transfer of funds and technological know-how. The Chinese approach is pioneering in many respects.
This is not to suggest that it is without problems. As will become clear in the discussion that The Chinese approach towards agricultural development assistance is firmly based upon the idea of mutual reciprocity. In official reports, a strong emphasis is placed upon exporting the benefits of the Chinese development experience. Highlighting the critical importance of agricultural reform in the early stages of China's "reform and opening,"
Chinese officials stress the longer-term value of increasing productivity growth in smallholder agriculture and meeting basic needs on the basis of limited foreign exchange. 81 Creating larger economies of scale to improve efficiencies in agricultural production, and investing in complementary value-added industries related to agriculture are seen as critical components of a broader agricultural investment strategy. 82 In the academic discourse, the value of Chinese agricultural assistance has been cast in even broader terms with references to legitimacy concerns and image maintenance. Wang Rui argues that China has a "right to speak" (话语权) on matters relating to international food security because of its own miraculous achievement in feeding a huge population and demonstrated success in alleviating poverty writ large. 83 Chinese scholars have also noted the importance of countering the negative image of a neo-colonial power plundering African resources. 84 For Chinese investment and aid projects in Africa to work, it is deemed essential that the African people have greater trust in Chinese aid, Chinese companies, and Chinese products.
The African showcase
Chinese agricultural assistance to Africa is seen as the showcase for demonstrating the value African agricultural technicians and experts in China.
The approach towards enhancing food security in Africa is technologically oriented towards increasing productivity. The Tripartite Partnerships for Development in Africa between China, the United Kingdom, and Africa is a recent promising trend in this regard.
A second problem concerns how to leverage greater development benefits from Chinese commercial operations. Ironically, while the blurring of aid and commerce is generally seen as a major constraint on development effectiveness, for the Chinese government the problem is more that these two realms of investment remain overly distinct.
In an effort to promote corporate social responsibility, government agencies such as the 93 
Changing the rules of the game: Learning by doing
The above discussion has identified at least three key areas in which Chinese domestic food security concerns and international priorities converge. emergency relief, macro-control, and regulatory functions. 96 The Chinese government has also promoted "guided development" of the bio-fuel sector based upon the principle of "not competing for land with food" and ensuring that "energy security [does] not come at a cost to food security." 97 It has increased donations to the FAO, the WFP, and the International Agricultural Consultative Group, and now plays a stronger role in the CFS.
Second, Chinese support for recipient driven agricultural development assistance accords with global efforts to reduce the disincentive effects of aid interventions upon agricultural development. In many ways, China is reaping the rewards of being a latecomer in joining the donor community. Problems associated with Western-led official development assistance (ODA) to Africa, in particular, have been carefully studied. China has also gained useful experience as a recipient of ODA. 98 Third, the Chinese principle of "different methods for different conditions" is in keeping with the current development philosophy at the international level that seeks to avoid a "one size fits all" donor mentality. Another principle of "Guidance, Step-By-Step" (分类指 导，循序渐进), which means taking account of local conditions and implementing pilot programmes, also reveals a preference for experimentation rather than the imposition of any particular model. 99 Contrary to the expectations of some commentators, the Chinese countries. Rather the emphasis is more upon a careful consideration of what particular aspects of the Chinese experience may suit local conditions.
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In other ways, the Chinese approach towards enhancing food security at the global level is likely to lead to tensions amongst the donor community. Now at the vanguard of a reform oriented agenda, it is by no means clear that China will take a leadership role in fostering a new compact between traditional and new donors within the international food regime. Two particular problems stand out. First, the principle of "mutual benefits" sets China apart from other traditional donors that are more intent upon meeting their international obligations. For China, international responsibility is still double-faced. In promoting agricultural cooperation, the basic principle of "putting ourselves first, seeking win-win cooperation" (以我为主，合作共) prevails over all other priorities. What this means in practice is that increasing agricultural efficiency overseas must not come at a cost to Chinese farmers' incomes and the protection of domestic industries. 101 Decoupling domestic interests from international aid may not be politically expedient in the short term, but it is difficult to see how China can truly become a stakeholder in global governance on the basis of a "China first" approach.
The second problem is that Chinese rhetorical support for the depoliticization of aid and adherence to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs increasingly contradicts current practice. While some Chinese commentators have been quick to criticize the United States for linking its food aid with democracy promotion overseas, it is also the case that Chinese food aid is not devoid of politics; commercial and political interests intersect in ways that are difficult to disentangle. While the benefits of Chinese food aid can only be legitimately assessed on the part of the beneficiaries involved, the "non-interference" 100 He Wenping, "The Balancing Act of China's Africa Policy," China Security 3, no. principle is proving increasingly problematic in contexts where the Chinese presence is exposed to local conflicts and instability.
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In the final analysis, China is in the process of changing the rules of the game. No longer on the sidelines, it is now a key player in negotiating the evolving norms of international conduct. In comparing China with other traditional donors a major difference lies in the fact that it places a premium upon the idea of gaining experience before endorsing a particular set of principles. In other words, the Chinese approach towards international cooperation is quintessentially pragmatic, based upon learning by doing rather than learning by principle. Strong Chinese preferences for food sovereignty, recipient driven aid, and winwin cooperation present opportunities and challenges for the international food regime. Over time they may help to facilitate consent, especially between traditional and new donors, but it is difficult to see how such an approach can strengthen the global governance of food security in the absence of binding commitments.
Conclusion
In returning to the bigger question posed at the beginning of this paper-is China likely to strengthen its participation in the broader effort to eliminate world hunger, or will an enduring commitment to national independence guide its approach-it is fair to say that
China is now an active participant in the international food regime, but current practice is still heavily weighted towards domestic concerns. It would be easy to conclude that the Chinese approach towards food security is contradictory, caught between the legacies of the past and the hopes for the future. Rather, I would argue that what we are currently witnessing is a broadening of the Chinese conception of self-interest.
The suggestion that China's quest to feed its huge population will lead to conflicts between states seems vastly overdrawn for at least three reasons. The first is that the powerful Chinese norm of self-sufficiency acts as a safeguard against price volatility and relieves the burden on international markets. Second, the international food regime looks different compared with its pre-2008 design, in that global food policy is now debated and acted upon in diverse institutional settings at global and regional levels. Third, China's cooperative efforts towards combating world hunger can be demonstrated in practice. Above all, it has been successful in balancing its national interests with international responsibility, albeit in a way that leans towards China.
Certainly, tensions exist over China's unyielding support for the principle of noninterference that delegitimizes the interest of participating states in each other's internal affairs. In the future, the contradiction between investing in the resources of another state while proclaiming a politically neutral position over its future development trajectory will become more difficult to reconcile. One could also easily argue that China could be doing more commensurate with its growing power and influence in the world. On balance, however, humanity's visceral need for food may well prove to be the one global challenge that motivates genuine Chinese leadership.
